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There is a lot of curiosity on the direction that the relationship between Africa and the 
United States, which has, at times, been hostile and disappointing, amusing and 
inspirational, will take because of Obama‟s unusual background. He is a product, and a 
beneficiary, of the success of anti-colonial and civil rights struggles in Africa and the 
United States although he has little first hand knowledge of those struggles either as a 
victim or a victimizer. With an African father and an American mother, he is the first 
African-American to become president. Essentially a child of two worlds, he prefers the 
world of America as opposed to that of Africa. 
 
The excitement about Obama in Africa is also partly because he is a big contrast to his 
predecessor, George W. Bush, with whom he has some things in common. Both appeared 
to have rebellious streaks, had the best education in elite schools culminating in graduate 
studies at Harvard whether in business or in law. Both are sharp and determined political 
calculators with ability to play serious hardball. This might explain why each engaged in 
some sort of public service with disadvantaged African-Americans before releasing 
political ambitions in Texas for Bush and Illinois for Obama. Both succeeded with 
unexpected speed, Bush playing damn and Obama just the opposite.  
 
The perceived contrast attracted people to Obama who eventually made him president. 
While to many Africans, Bush was a source of concern rather than inspiration, Obama 
was different and was “one of us”. While some of the Bush policies appeared designed to 
victimize and blame Africans for the mess that Americans and their followers in the West 
had made, there is excitement about Obama and a belief that he would not commit the 
same blunders. He inspires forces that see in him a man through whom they can push 
different agenda that may not be in his agenda. To many such forces, Obama is likely to 





disappoint because he is basically an American whose father happens to have been 
Kenyan, and he was not there when it counted. 
 
Americans, Slavery, and Colonization in Africa 
Pre-independence days for African relations with Americans were generally negative, 
and occasionally inspirational. Americans were part of the white world that brutalized 
Africans through slavery and colonialism. The lasting scar of that relationship is Liberia, 
created as a dumping ground for unwanted black people who happened to be “free”.
1
 
They championed the right of white men to rule and grab African lands with impunity. 
While in Nairobi in 1909, ex-president Theodore Roosevelt asserted that black people 
“have not governed themselves and never could," and that “it would be a crime to the white 
races to fail to turn Africa into white man‟s country”.
2
 Exactly one century later, Roosevelt 
is probably turning in his grave watching a descendant of one of those who “never could” 
govern being the official resident at the White House.  
 
American Inspiration to Africans 
Moments of inspiration to Africans initially came from black Americans and then from a 
few top government officials after World War II. Men such as Booker T. Washington 
with his Tuskegee, Marcus Garvey with his Negro World, and W.E.B DuBois with his 
crusades for Pan-Africanism seemed like evidence that Africans could excel despite 
colonial adversities. They catalysed men like Mbiyu Koinange in Kenya, Kwame 
Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, and Azikiwe of Nigeria to attend American colleges. These 
men then imported into Africa, among other things, Abraham Lincoln‟s 1863 Gettysburg 
Address about governments being of the people, for the people, and by the people. They 
became thorns to colonialism. 
 
The United States emerged from World War II with an anti-colonialist image that quickly 
dissipated partly due to the Cold War which, argues John B. Judis, “shaped and distorted 
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the United States reaction to the powerful movements against imperialism.”
3
 Caught 
between championing anti-colonialism and condoning colonialism, Harry S. Truman 
launched his 1949 Point Four program which was poorly implemented
4
 and appeared to 





The American image improved slightly with the emergence of Senator John F. Kennedy 
of Massachusetts as the symbol of American empathy with colonized Africans. He 
helped to fund the 1959 and 1960 East African student airlift to the United States. One of 
the major benefits of the airlift is that roughly fifty years later, there is a US president 
whose father was reportedly in one of the airlifts, Barrack Obama Sr. After becoming 
president, Kennedy not only continued with the student airlifts, he also mounted the 
peace corps program whose graduates today run many activities as experts, academics, 
diplomats, and heads of organizations dealing with Africa. The assassination in 
November 1963 of this symbol of American support for anti-colonialism marked the end 
of the period of inspiration, and many Africans felt the loss. 
 
After Kennedy‟s death, Africans were disappointed by American identification with the 
remaining racist colonies in Southern Africa. Ronald Reagan represented this racist 
attitude as he argued, "can we abandon this country [South Africa] that has stood beside 
us in every war we've ever fought?" in 1981 and in 1985 added, "they have eliminated the 
segregation that we once had in our own country."
6
 Racism in the United States 
continued to be a factor and the prism through which many issues were perceived and, 
despite Obama, it is doubtful whether it has stopped.  
 
This was the case even as Africans were caught up in Cold War politics with its new 
master-state/client-state relationship, baptized neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism was 
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symbiotic between individual leaders in client-states to protect the interests of the master-
state while leaders in master-state protected their clients from the public; three varieties 
emerged. There were those leaders who chose their relationship with master states; those 
that were forced into that condition; and there were those who freely flirted with all 
camps and switched sides whenever it suited their purpose.   
 
Neo-colonialism as a doctrine of external control lost its value to the West in the 1970s 
with the success of the “Marxists” in Africa and the humiliation of the Americans in 
Vietnam and Iran. In Angola, Americans appeared particularly sinister as they blessed 
South Africa‟s invasion only to be countered by Cubans with Soviet arms. Angola, 
initially an ideological battlefield, lost direction and plunged into a looting civil war with 
no ideological validity. Symbiotic relationship with individual leaders proved unreliable 
and Washington, therefore, started abandoning what Henry Kissinger termed “the essence 




Looking for a way out of its predicament and restore a sense of self-worth, Washington 
decided to abandon leaders who reportedly had outlived their usefulness. It also sought to 
be seen to identify with the aspirations of ordinary people instead of the ruling elites
8
 and 
it developed two strategies. These were to reduce or minimize bilateral dealings with 
Third World leaders and to adopt new rhetoric in international discourse targeting Third 
World countries. The effect was to reduce visible American friendship with leaders who 
had become irrelevant. The irrelevancy of neo-colonialism gave way to the emergence of 
postmodern colonialism.  
 
Postmodern colonialism tends to devalue states and regimes as manipulators, in master 
states, claim to understand the victim in his own context and then try to explain to the 
victim how he should understand himself. This “understanding” is like a palliative to the 
victim not to complain too much, given that his concerns and perceptions are reasonably 
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accommodated. The victims are advised, guided, instructed, and ordered to downsize 
everything and to open up the country to international operators who do not assume 
responsibility for anything going wrong. The tools used are international bureaucrats who 
act like „missionaries‟ for liberalization in small and weak countries, but behind such 
missionaries is the military might of the master states ready to flex muscles.  
 
The „missionaries‟ engaged in blame shifting that denies victims ability to demand 
redress by making the suffering to take the blame for suffering.  Blame shifting is initially 
orchestrated at the intellectual level where ground is laid to rationalize denying assistance 
to the victims and to provide leverage to dictate laws to the victim countries. Master 
states remain officially invisible and avoid blame as control is tightened with the victim 
taking responsibility for whatever may go wrong. In this way, functionaries and officials 
on the ground become instruments of blame shifting and post-modern colonialism.  
 
The strategy of blame shifting crystallized in the early 1980s and coincided with the 
presence into political power in key Western countries of like minded leaders who 
disdained Third World countries. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher led, the others 
followed, in forcing client states to listen to instructions from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the “missionaries”. Rejecting “special consideration”, 
they insisted that poor countries compete with the “developed” ones in a neo-liberal 
economic framework.
9
 Missionaries, making it their business to reorganize African states 
and resources in ways that hurt, became vocal in blaming the victims. They stressed state 
failure to provide services which then justified calling for privatization. This meant 
denying states the ability to provide services and giving foreigners a right to expropriate 
and control a country‟s institutions.   
 
Missionaries were supplemented by new political rhetoric and promotion of NGOs and 
civil society in a process of making the United States to appear to be on the side of the 
people. One of the ways it did this was to create a bipartisan organ, the National 
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Endowment for Democracy in 1982/83 whose mission was to promote American values 
on free press, civil society, trade unionism, and political activism. It entailed support for 
NGOs and the promotion of civil society which then made a lot of noise about political 
pluralism and the shortcomings of their own states. It is this development that explains 
the pressure that the United States started putting on leaders of its client states such as 
Moi of Kenya and Mobutu of Zaire in the 1980s, long before the end of the Cold War, in 
what would become the New World Order. 
 
The New World Order destabilized several African regimes that found themselves at the 
receiving end of American hostility and Kenya was one of them.  Caught flatfooted in the 
new attitude, Kenya was seemingly tuned into a policy laboratory for diplomatic 
experiments on how to handle Africans. It was in Kenya that the idea of conditionalities 
was first mooted in the 1980s and where diplomatic noise making as a way of pressuring 
African leaders to do the bidding of the master state was inaugurated. Starting with Smith 
Hempstone, who survived expulsion only because the United States was a big power, 
other Western countries followed and as a result diplomatic noise making has, since 
1990, become so common that it is expected as a norm.  
 
Glaring contradictions between professed ideals and the crude behaviour in promoting 
perceived interests became evident in the Bush presidency. With the United States 
believing, as Condoleezza Rice claimed, that it had been called to lead,
10
 those who 
hesitated following the lead were treated roughly and Kenya is an example despite having 
things in common with the United States. Both countries had an anti-British colonial past, 
hold regular elections and occasionally have problems counting votes, have experienced 
aspects of petty and grand corruption, and both have been victims of international 
terrorism. Yet despite such similarities, there were serious disputes due to the fact that 
one is a master state and the other is a client state.  
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While the master states like to advise and instruct Kenya on what its interests should be, 
Kenya sought to pursue its own interests. This angered the master states which then 
undertook to contain Kenya
11
 using NGOs and “civil society‟ organs fronting for selected 
politicians as well as raising the pitch in diplomatic noise making, both orally and in 
print. Ambassadors became columnists and guests in electronic media talk shows in 
which they advised Kenyans how to run the country, fight corruption, draft a constitution, 
and behave when relating to “donors”. They occasionally hurled insults at the country in 
the belief that they had a natural right to do so and that, more than Kenyans, they knew 




The United States was involved in trying to bring Kenya to its knees for daring to act 
independently. It had failed to support the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, close the 
Iraqi embassy and seize Iraqi assets,
13
 exempt Americans from criminal prosecutions, and 
pass an anti-terrorist bill.
14
 It had even joined a Third World rebellion in the WTO 
Conference at Cancun. Having incurred the wrath of the master states, which became 
openly hostile,
15
 Kenya had to be punished and part of the punishment included spreading 




Spreading rumours was part of a process of manufacturing hostile consensus on Kenya. 
“Public opinion can be mobilized … through the media and motivation of influential 
groups,” wrote England based Sunday Standard Columnist Fred Mudhai, in order to “stir 
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a revolution against the government.”
17
 There was effort to portray Kenya as collapsing, 
as being responsible for international terrorism,
18
 and not having a “valuable and 
civilized relations”
19
 with master states. There were then “objective” studies such as the 
one produced by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, an American think tank with 
capacity to engineer consensus
20
 that, in its July/August 2005 issue of Foreign Policy, 
declared Kenya to be a failed state. Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Moses 




In effort to “mobilize opinion” against the government, master states believed that “their 
criticism should be treated as sacrosanct.”
22
  The local media helped them to feel 
“sacrosanct” and seemingly distorted stories to make the government look weak, and not 
acceptable.
23
 At times the media committed journalistic fraud to give the wrong 
impression
24




As local celebrities, these noise making diplomats tended to miss the irony of their own 
positions. British High Commissioner Edward Clay reportedly had a habit of flying in the 
Kenyan airspace without a license
26
 and participated in a corrupt Journalist of the Year 
Award (JOYA) function at the Hotel Intercontinental in Nairobi where he accused 
Kenyans of voting on his shoes.
27
 He was supported by his American counterpart, 
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William Bellamy who praised Clay
28
  and later promised to fund and encourage Kenyans 
“with the courage to stand up” against the government and probably, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Raphael Tuju wondered, effect a “regime change.”
29
 There was then an upsurge 
of, as a Daily Nation editorial noted, “presumably well funded civil societies types”
30
 
demonstrating on the streets. An amusing spectacle involved a globe trotting professional 
demonstration organizer, once he saw TV cameras, unsuccessfully pleading with the 




The demonstrations aimed at showing Kenyans were “fed up” with the government were 
fuelled by what Peter Mwaura of the Nation, termed “a rogue superpower seeking a 
regime change”.
32
 In the process, what The Leader called” self-appointed democracy 
watchdogs”
33
 became, Mutuma Mathiu of Sunday Standard observed, “factional warriors 
in the NaRC wars … taking sides in the power struggle” because the power struggle gave 
them “an opportunity to project more influence.”
34
 As warriors, they funded political 
factions “under the name of civic education”
35
 and were receptive to requests for “help in 




Seeing things the expected way appeared to have been in operation in the 2007 general 
elections when the master states seemingly encouraged defiance of the law and 
procedures. They, or through their proxies in civil society and NGOs, funded particular 
candidates and seemingly endorsed notions of making the country ungovernable if “their” 
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man did not win. They had preconceived positions on who should not win. London, 
reportedly threatening to pull out of Iraq if it did not get its way in Kenya, appeared to be 
the driving force with Washington and Berlin tagging along. 
 
A new doctrine of encouraging favoured losers to mount electoral robbery with violence 
in order to attain what failed in the ballot box seemed to be in the works. In the midst of 
the crisis in January 2008, for instance, they ignored the fact that the media can set 
agenda that injures a country‟s interests
37
 and promote genocide as happened with Radio 
Mille Collines in Rwanda.
38
 In Kenya, the Kriegler Commission concluded that the 
media “added fuel to the flames.”
39
 And the ambassador of the United States seemed to 
enjoy inciting people to violate laws by declaring, “I am very happy that … I am 
violating the ban because I do not agree with it.”
40
 He declared that in a live FM station 
that was known for telling its audience to “clear the weed”, referring to potential 
victims.
41
 The ambassador, concluded Makumi Mwagiru, “broke the rules of diplomacy 
by violating a rule of law in the receiving state, and doing so deliberately.”
42
 He did that 
because he represented a master state that has capacity to violate other countries‟ 
sovereignty at will.
43
 He made Americans looked as if they were inciters to violence in 
harmony with the new doctrine. 
 
Such seeming arrogance informed African reaction to the creation of the African 
Command or AFRICOM that, admitted Mary C. Yates, was poorly explained and one 
that many African countries were reluctant to host.
44
 In itself, AFRICOM, is an indication 
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that Africa is moving up in the radar of US security importance.
45
 Given that AFRICOM 
was a Bush creation with his „grand strategy‟ involving the doctrine of pre-emptive strike 
on those not seen to toe the line,
46
 the suggestion sent fears. This is essentially so since 
AFRICOM is expected to outsource services to Private Security Companies, PSC,
47
 who 
operate like sanitized mercenaries.
48
 The number of such PSCs in Africa is on the 
increase and Andrew Bearpark, Director General of the British Association of Private 
Security Companies, noted, “carry out activities previously performed by national 
militaries” and the US leads in outsourcing.
49
      
 
The Obama Inspiration 
 
There was great excitement in Africa, and Kenya in particular, with Barack Obama as 
president of the United States. He is the first president to have had direct Kenyan 
experience, including traveling in matatus and having relatives who show up 
unannounced and expect to be attended it. Considered one of “us”, there were high 
expectations that he might be better than Bush. But beyond being an inspiration, Obama 
is first and foremost an American.  
 
Africans would be foolish to expect different outcomes from those of Bush if there is a 
conflict between the perceived interests of the United States and those of Africa. This 
point was made clear by Johnnie Carson, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, who stated that there will be no change since Republicans and Democrats have a 
bipartisan attitude towards Africa. When Carson was ambassador to Kenya, serving the 
Republicans, there were frictions between Kenya‟s interests and his perception of what 
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those interests should be; he was noisy in making clear what the instructions to Kenya 
were.   
 
The situation is not thrilling when looking at the statements and behavior of some players 
in Obama‟s team. In Obama‟s major policy speeches, to start with, Africa hardly features. 
One of his key economic advisors is Larry Summers whose views on Africa, if they have 
not changed, are not flattering. Summers advocated what is termed “garbage 
imperialism” that is tantamount to global environmental racism
50
 in which all types of 
wastes include nuclear, expired medicines, technological out-of- dates, and even 
contaminated foods can be dumped in Africa. In reportedly advising the World Bank in 
December 1991 to export “dirty industries” to LDCs, he argued that parts of Africa are 
“under-populated” and “vastly under-polluted.”
51
 The question is whether he is still 
giving that kind of economic advice to Obama. If he is, then expect the dumping of toxic 




Obama has chance to recapture lost credibility and he has asserted that he would like to 
do that. If he buys into Condoleezza Rice‟s belief that “an international order that reflects 
our values is the best guarantee of our enduring national interest, and [that] America 
continues to have a unique opportunity to shape this outcome,”
52
 he might need to take 
into account the advice by John Lewis Gaddis to display “better manners” and to realize 
that “it is always a bad idea to confuse power with wisdom.”
53
 He generally seems to 
have started well.  
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Obama is an American looking after perceived American interests which are not 
necessarily synonymous with African interests. While the fact that he has relatives in 
Africa is inspirational and might attract some tourists to Kenya, he can be ruthless in 
promoting whatever he perceives to be American interests. The difference being that he 
will not be accused of racism if he harasses African countries into compliance with 
American dictates.  
 
When he completes reviewing United States national security and foreign policy 
positions to reflect his stated desire not to be bogged down by ideology, his position on 
Africa might be clear. Will he avoid the trap of American ideologies overriding “facts 
and reality”? He talked of some countries being on the wrong side of history yet in many 
instances it was the United States that was on the wrong side and had to adjust. With 
Obama, the prospects for major changes in attitude remain to be seen given that Africa is 
still relegated to the bottom of the foreign policy pecking order. They may be, 




With Obama, African admiration of Americans might increase and the United States will 
continue to be looked upon to offer leadership because it has more might militarily, 
technologically, and economically than any other country. It has played this role well 
many times, whether it is in financing UN operations or providing disaster relief. The 
admiration for things American is apparent in the media, educational institutions, and in 
music and the cinemas. Africans follow events and elections in the United States, were 
amused by ballot counting problems in Florida and were excited by Obama‟s election.  
 
Whether Obama is there or not, it is the dark side of the Americans where perceived 
hypocrisy and double standards become their hallmark, that is of concern. Americans talk 
of freedom of movement of people and goods and then close their doors to all others, 
especially the Africans. The idea of “open doors” is seemingly for others to open theirs 
for Americans to come in freely but not for others to enter their market or country. As an 
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object of concern, it appears to be a bully, mean, arrogantly ignoring international laws 
that it expects others to follow. It piously talks of democracy while ignoring the 
democratic wishes of others and has seemingly subscribed to the doctrine of encouraging 
losers to mount electoral robbery with violence in order to acquire power.  
 
It pursues its interests vigorously and would not allow anyone else to tell it what those 
interests are, and yet it purports to tell other countries what their interests should be or 
how they should pursue them. It does not blink when violating the sovereignty of other 
countries and yet it appears to be surprised that other countries would want to pursue 
their own interests vigorously. Will Obama be different? I doubt whether the harassment 
that Africans get trying to obtain visas will stop now that Obama is in the White House. 
 
An impression exists that the United States is out to impose its will at any time, on 
whomever it wants, and in any manner that it wants. It seems to subscribe to the view that 
powerful countries do not have to obey international laws because they are big.
55
 
Africans expect “better manners” with Obama. He has given impression that he might 
obey international law. The question is whether he will instruct his representatives in 
Africa to have “better manners” and to obey “local laws” as required in diplomatic 
practice. Another one is whether he still will be held hostage on African issues by former 
colonial powers. 
 
So what is the general picture? It is one in which Africa‟s desire to make independent 
decisions is hampered by over dependency on, and subservience to, the master states, led 
by the United States, who then believe that they have a right to do anything they want, 
irrespective of the law. Their diplomats behave like colonial governors and in dealing 
with governments, like that of Kenya, they are crass since their apparent intent is to 
humiliate rather than reach amicable understanding on what mutual interests are. Will 
Obama assume, like Bush before him, that the United States is the only country on the 
right side of history? In turn, African governments shoot themselves in the foot by 
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seemingly tolerating people of questionable values, who can be used to undermine them, 
in policy making positions. This is a weakness master states are quick to exploit with 
relish and Obama, in pursuing American interests as he thinks, is likely to continue with 
the tradition.  
 
The United States leads other master states in the way of relating to poor countries 
although it is sometimes held hostage on African issues by former colonial powers, partly 
because it considers other regions more valuable than Africa. Americans started attacks 
on African states in the form of diplomatic noise making that Britons and Germans later 
seemed to enjoy. Will the United States, under Obama, start new diplomatic behaviour 
that displays “better manners” in relating to Africa? Will this beneficiary of African anti-
colonialism and American civil rights movement free himself from the Euro-American 
disdain for Africans and show some respect to Africans? Will he liberate himself from 
the American mentality that European powers have a right of preference in their former 
African colonies? If he does, less powerful master states will most likely do one of two 
things. They will either pay attention to the American lead in relating to Africans, or 
simply ignore him. 
